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Article
Mastering Eliot's Paradox: Fostering
Cultural Memory in an Age of Illusion
and Allusion
Jim Chent
Living organisms are monuments to natural history. Plants,
animals, and microbes all bear the fingerprints of evolution.' Li-
braries likewise manifest the development of human culture.
'Time present and time past / Are both perhaps present in time
future, / And time future contained in time past."2 The arrival of
the University of Minnesota Law Library's millionth volume
therefore provides an apt occasion on which to contemplate the
librarian's craft and how it informs (or should inform) the law
governing the acquisition, preservation, and transmission of
knowledge.
This Article tackles this challenge in three stages. Drawing
upon T. S. Eliot's works of literary criticism, Part I describes the
contradictory role of cultural memory in a society saturated with
new information. Even as the accumulation of information in a
technologically explosive society heightens the value of the most
prominent cultural landmarks, each distinct cultural expression
commands an ever-diminishing amount of attention.
Parts II and II turn from literary theory to legal doctrine.
After reviewing the Supreme Court's cases on library manage-
ment, Part II endorses two basic principles within the law of h-
t Associate Dean for Faculty and James L. Krusemark Professor of
Law, University of Minnesota Law School, chenx064@maroon.tc.umn.edu.
Daniel A. Farber and Gil Grantmore provided helpful comments. Special
thanks to Kathleen Chen.
1. Cf. DAVID M. RAUP, EXTINCTION: BAD GENES OR BAD LUCK? 41-42
(1991) (disputing the assumption that "living fossils" such as the coelacanth
have somehow "survived unchanged for hundreds of millions of years" or "have
ever evolved an immunity to extinction).
2. T. S. ELIOT, Burnt Norton, in FOUR QUARTETS 13, 13 (Harcourt Brace &
Co. 1971) (1943).
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brarianship as a branch of First Amendment jurisprudence.
First, decisions to acquire material should lie beyond judicial
challenge. Second, legislative mandates to exclude material
should draw strict scrutiny and should be presumed unconstitu-
tional. Part III concludes that uncertainty within the high
Court's jurisprudence on librarianship should be resolved in favor
of more liberal access to information.
I. BACK TO THE FUTURISTS: ELIOT'S PARADOX
When culture changes, law changes with it.3 Changes in ma-
terial and political reality dictate corresponding changes in the
social understanding of the "majestic generalities" of the Consti-
tution.4 The pragmatic need to recalibrate constitutional doctrine
has reached its apex in an age in which the "ratio of growth to or-
der" in human knowledge and human population approximates
that of "a brain tumor."5 '"Worthy normative and institutional
ideas about constitutionalism remain of limited value unless we
can demonstrate their suitability to our high-speed world."6 To be
sure, constitutions and other foundational laws are "intended to
endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs." 7 Within any "covenant running
from" generation to generation, however, "[e]ach generation must[reject] anew.., ideas and aspirations" not fit to "survive more
ages than one."8 Even those human institutions that are designed
to serve "an indefinite but presumably long future" will not en-
dure in an age of speed, however, unless they consciously adapt
in response to rapid and rampant change.9
3. Cf. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 550 (1991)(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen the Court changes its mind, the law changes
with it.").
4. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947); accord Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966).
5. STEPHEN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS,
BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE 119 (2001). See generally JAMES R. BENIGER,
THE CONTROL REvOLuTION: TECHNOLOGICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY (1986); JAMES GLEICK, FASTER: THE ACCELERATION OF
JUST ABOUT EVERYTHING (2000).
6. William E. Scheuerman, Constitutionalism in an Age of Speed, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 353, 387 (2002).
7. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
8. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901
(1992).
9. Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Chrononomy, 13 RATIO JURIS 31, 33
(2000).
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Seeking the signature characteristic by which to define mod-
ern society, John Dewey chose its "mania for motion and speed:"'10
'The fact of change has been so continual and so intense that it
overwhelms our minds. We are bewildered by the spectacle of its
rapidity, scope and intensity."" Our "knowledge derived from ex-
perience" appears and is "new in every moment / And every mo-
ment is a new and shocking / Valuation of all we have been."'
12
Whether by design or by happenstance, human civilization has
proceeded according to the aesthetic and political philosophy ex-
pressed by the early twentieth-century's futurist movement.
13
"[T]he splendor of the world has been enriched with a new
beauty," proclaimed The Futurist Manifesto in 1909, "the beauty
of speed."'14 Contemporary industrialized societies have affirma-
tively embraced "[s]peed [as] the form of ecstasy the technical
revolution has bestowed on man."15 But the quest for informa-
tional omniscience and technological control has pushed human-
ity beyond a threshold from which it cannot return: "A law of ac-
celeration, definite and constant as any law of mechanics, cannot
be supposed to relax its energy to suit the convenience of man."'
16
The acceleration of history has triggered a correlative, awful re-
sponsibility: that of managing "omnipresent speed" on "the ex-
treme promontory of the centuries."'17
Modem societies take speed for granted and routinely as-
sume its benevolence. Contemporary technologists often breath-
lessly predict that the ongoing "Information Revolution will trig-
ger a ... sweeping transformation" of our lives, mostly for the
better.1i In matters affecting communications policy, including
constitutional protection for freedom of speech, "[niew technology
10. JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 140 (1954).
11. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SoCIAL AcTION 57 (1935).
12. T. S. ELIOT, East Coker, in FOUR QUARTETS, supra note 2, at 23, 26.
13. See generally CINZIA SARTINI BLUM, THE OTHER MODERNISM: F.T.
MARINETTI'S FUTURIST FICTION OF POWER (1996); STEPHEN KERN, THE
CULTURE OF TIME AND SPACE, 1880-1918, at 119-23 (1983).
14. Filippo Tommaso Marinetti, Futurist Manifesto, LE FIGARO, Feb. 20,
1909, at 4, reprinted and translated in ART OF OUR CENTURY: THE CHRONICLE
OF WESTERN ART, 1900 TO THE PRESENT 99 (Jean-Louis Ferrier & Yann Le
Pichon eds., Walter D. Glanze trans., 1988).
15. MILAN KUNDERA, SLOWNESS 2 (Linda Asher trans., 1997).
16. HENRY ADAMS, A Law of Acceleration, in THE EDUCATION OF HENRY
ADAMS 489, 493 (Ernest Samuels ed., 1974) (1918).
17. Marinetti, supra note 14, at 8.
18. MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS, WHAT WILL BE: HOW THE NEW WORLD OF
INFORMATION WILL CHANGE OUR LIVES 9 (1997).
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is the easy answer to everything."19 Laws forged within this nor-
mative vision seek quite self-consciously to "keep pace with the
progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the new devel-
opments of time and circumstances."20 Through its assumption
that new speech is an unalloyed good, 21 First Amendment juris-
prudence implicitly prefers change. Though in retreat throughout
much of American law, a romantic strain of libertarianism per-
vades the law of free speech.22 First Amendment jurisprudence
celebrates the "puny anonymities" whose rebellious utterances
propel societal change. 23 "If in the long run the beliefs expressed
[by unpopular speakers] are destined to be accepted by the domi-
nant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is
that they should be given their chance and have their way."24
Within contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence, "[t]echno-
logical change... provides a singularly uncontroversial justifica-
tion for modifying established doctrine."25
Postindustrial society generally embraces the futurist com-
mitment to speed. Adaptation to speed breeds comfort in the in-
evitability of change and in the corrosively liberating power of
"[c]onstant revolutionizing of production" and "uninterrupted dis-
turbance of all social conditions" to sweep away "[a]ll fixed, fast-
frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable preju-
dices and opinions."26 Even so, the cultural and legal impact of
the raw, awful beauty of speed demands careful examination.
Speed simultaneously expands the amount of information that
any culturally active individual must process and increases the
19. Thomas W. Hazlett, Predation in Local Cable TV Markets, 40
ANTITRUST BULL. 609, 643 (1995); see also Fred H. Cate, Telephone Companies,
the First Amendment, and Technological Convergence, 45 DEPAUL L. REv. 1035
(1996).
20. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, 9 (1877).
21. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) ('If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fal-
lacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence.').
22. Cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 949, 952-53 (1995) (characterizing free speech as one of the last bastions of
laissez-faire libertarianism in contemporary legal culture).
23. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).
24. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25. Monroe E. Price & John F. Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal
Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Congress and the Court, 97 COLUM.
L. REv. 976, 1008 (1997).
26. KARL MARX & FREDERICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 12
(New York Labor News Co. 1948) (1848).
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cultural premium on ever-narrower portions of the informational
bonanza. Libraries in particular embody this phenomenon. They
are at once dynamic archives of human experience and sanctuar-
ies where the exhausted may seek refuge among "the amblers of
yesteryear," among "those loafing heroes of folk song, those vaga-
bonds who roam from one mill to another and bed down under
the stars."27
Librarianship helps an information-based society "find in
motion what was lost in space."2 8 Speed generates an extensive
and ever greater backlog of information. One survey of a compre-
hensive Internet archive estimated that one billion Web pages as
of July 2000 contained 33.5 terabytes (trillion bytes).29 "Print,
film, magnetic, and optical storage media produced about 5 ex-
abytes of new information in 2002," enough to fill the Library of
Congress's book collections 37,000 times.30 Rife with "material
about topics ranging from aardvarks to Zoroastrianism,"3' Inter-
net content "is as diverse as human thought."3 2 "To explore the
womb, or tomb, or dreams; all these are usual / Pastimes and
drugs, and features of the press ... ."33 Online access has kept
pace, at a minimum, with the real-world information explosion.
34
The relentless effort to post every cultural artifact of any signifi-
cance has transformed the Internet into an electronic version of
Jorge Luis Borges's fanciful 'Map of the Empire whose size was
that of the Empire" itself.3
5
27. KUNDERA, supra note 15, at 3.
28. TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, THE GLASS MENAGERIE 97 (5th prtg. 1999)
(1945).
29. See BERNARDO A. HUBERMAN, THE LAWS OF THE WEB: PATrERNS IN THE
ECOLOGY OF INFORMATION 1 (2001).
30. How Much Information? 2003 (making this calculation on the assump-
tion that the seventeen million books in the Library of Congress, digitized with
full formatting, contain roughly 136 terabytes of information), at http://www.
sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how-much-info-2003/execsum.htm (Oct. 27,
2003). An exabyte is one quintillion bytes, perhaps more readily understood as
one billion billion bytes or one billion gigabytes. See id.
31. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002).
32. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affid, 521 U.S. 844
(1997).
33. T. S. ELIOT, The Dry Salvages, in FOUR QUARTETS FOUR QUARTETS, su-
pra note 2, at 35, 43.
34. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 117 (documenting the efforts of
search engines such as Yahoo! and Google to organize the massive reservoirs of
information the Internet contains).
35. JORGE LUIS BORGES, On Exactitude in Science, in COLLECTED FICTIONS
325, 325 (Andrew Hurley trans., 1998).
In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that
20051 1365
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In one sense, hastening the rate of change simply increases
the raw amount of information without affecting the human ca-
pacity to digest or convey information. Although "the farmer
since 1800 has become more productive in the United States by a
factor of 36," "[i]t still takes ... fifty minutes with a piece of chalk
to convey the notion of comparative advantage."36 By the same
token, however, accelerated change places a premium on long-
established, deeply entrenched sources of information. The prolif-
eration of information increases the value of the "classics," which
embody the tradition by which new talent must be measured.
(And thanks to the Supreme Court's willingness to uphold seem-
ingly interminable copyright extensions,3 7 classics in the public
domain have become in a very practical sense the only part of our
cultural heritage that today's creators may exploit without fear of
liability.) The persistence of time-tested cultural treasures
breathes truth into one of the law's most hackneyed cich&s: con-
temporary authors and inventors do indeed "stand on the shoul-
ders of giants."38
An unlikely source of inspiration may help us better under-
stand this paradox. Reactionary in temperament yet extremist in
vision and voice, T. S. Eliot was not only the most deeply conser-
vative English-language poet of the twentieth century but also a
fitting prophet of our information-driven age. The usual criticism
leveled at Eliot is that he lacked sufficient "interest in the great
middle ground of human experience (as distinct from the ex-
the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the
map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Uncon-
scionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds
struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and
which coincided point for point with it.
Id.
36. Donald McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, 63 AM. SCHOLAR 177, 177-78
(1994).
37. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
38. E.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see, e.g.,
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1515 n.15 (9th Cir. 1993)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 n.33 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Bergt,
241 B.R. 17, 29 (D. Alaska 1999); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l,
740 F. Supp. 37, 77 n.3 (D. Mass. 1990); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the
Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 503, 511 (1945); Suzanne Scotchmer,
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,
5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 29 (1991); cf. OASIS, STANDING ON THE SHOULDER OF
GIANTS (Sony Records 2000) (extending the metaphor into the realm of rock 'n'
roll music). See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS: A
SHANDEAN POSTSCRIPT (1965) (tracing the origins of this metaphor in a letter
from Isaac Newton to Robert Hooke).
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tremes of saint and sinner)."39 On the other hand, "his positive
qualities" included "his poetic cunning, his fine craftsmanship,
his original accent, his historical and representative importance
as the poet of the modern Symbolist-metaphysical tradition."40 In
particular, Eliot's obsession with the frontiers of human experi-
ence equipped him superbly to describe the challenge of creating
and conveying culture in an accelerated and overwhelmingly
complex world.
In Tradition and the Individual Talent, Eliot observed: "No
poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His
significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to
the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must
set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead."41 No poet
can "surrender[ ] himself wholly to the work to be done" unless
"he is conscious, not of what is dead, but of what is already liv-
ing."42 Contrary to the myth of the solitary creative genius, no
novelist, artist, musician, or inventor draws her "craft out of thin
air."4 3 Constitutional jurisprudence has implicitly acknowledged
the wisdom of America's greatest expatriate poet:
In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be,
few, if any, things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and
original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, bor-
rows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well
known and used before. 44
Contemporary observers recognize a variant of this phenomenon
in "the oft-noted paradox of the Web": "the more information that
flows into" a constantly accelerating information-based society's
cultural "reservoirs, the harder it becomes to find any single piece
of information in that sea."45 Especially in the United States, or
in any other society scarred by cataclysmic episodes in its past,
39. 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 2163 (M. H.
Abrams et al. eds., 3d ed. 1974) [hereinafter NORTON ANTHOLOGY]. See generally
LYNDALL GORDON, T. S. ELIOT: AN IMPERFECT LIFE (1999); THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO T. S. ELIOT (A. David Moody ed., 1994).
40. 2 NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note 39, at 2163.
41. T. S. ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent, in THE SACRED WOOD
47, 49 (7th ed., 5th prtg. 1969).
42. Id. at 59.
43. Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 109, 110
(1991).
44. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436)
(Story, Cir. J.); accord Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575
(1994).
45. JOHNSON, supra note 5, at 117.
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tangible historical artifacts provide a crucial cultural link across
the ages.46
At the same time, the absolute amount of accumulated in-
formation reduces the actual uses of these traditions, more often
than not, to fleeting allusions. Eliot answered this challenge in
The Metaphysical Poets: "Our civilization comprehends great va-
riety and complexity, and this variety and complexity, playing
upon a refined sensibility, must produce various and complex re-
sults. The poet must become more and more comprehensive,
more allusive, more indirect, in order to force, to dislocate if nec-
essary, language into his meaning."47 The incredible accumula-
tion of information forces contemporary culture into far more
eclectic forms of expression, far more dependent on allusion to
create the illusion of continuity with ever-receding traditions. Fu-
sion cuisine and musical sampling feel like cultural pastiche be-
cause they are.
In short, Eliot observed that the rapid accumulation of in-
formation places a premium on the best, most enduring cultural
artifacts and expressions.48 He also predicted, quite accurately in
retrospect, that even the most prominent aspects of culture would
command progressively less attention.49 Occasions such as the
Law Library's acquisition of its millionth volume thus commemo-
rate both the static achievement of this milestone and the dy-
46. See, e.g., Sanford V. Levinson, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS
IN CHANGING SOCIETIES (1998); ALEXANDER STILLE, THE FUTURE OF THE PAST
41-45 (2002); A. Dan Tarlock, Slouching Toward Eden: The Eco-Pragmatic
Challenges of Ecosystem Revival, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1187-89 (2003), re-
printed in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND
THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 145 (Jim Chen ed., 2003); San-
ford Levinson, They Whisper: Reflections on Flags, Monuments, and State Holi-
days, and the Construction of Social Meaning in a Multicultural Society, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1079 (1995); John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cul-
tural Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339 (1989); cf. Joseph L. Sax, Heritage Preserva-
tion as a Public Duty: The Abbg Grdgoire and the Origins of an Idea, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1142 (1990) (describing environmental protection as a variation on a
broader theme of historic preservation); Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as
Countermonument: Federalism, Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective
Memory, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 (2003) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's
"'monumentalist' historical consciousness" exalts certain principles of federalism
established at the founding even as it systematically diminishes the exertion of
national power over the states first established during the Civil War and Recon-
struction).
47. T. S. Eliot, The Metaphysical Poets, in THE HOGARTH ESSAYS 212, 221
(1928).
48. See id.
49. See T. S. Eliot, The Waste Land, in 2 NORTON ANTHOLOGY, supra note
39, at 2171.
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namic mandate to maintain the collection's relevance in an in-
formation-driven society whose speed and complexity promise
never to abate.
II. LIBRARIANSHIP AS A CONSTITUTIONALLY
PRIVILEGED ENTERPRISE
These abstractions take us only so far. In The Metaphysical
Poets, Eliot explained how the accelerated flow of scientific
knowledge prevents modern poets from keeping artistic pace with
'"Racine or Donne" merely by looking into the heart. 50 Although
forcing poetry and art to "look into the cerebral cortex, the nerv-
ous system, and the digestive tracts" 51 does not come naturally to
a literary culture of "natural Luddites" who 'have never tried,
wanted, or been able to understand the industrial revolution,
much less accept it,"52 a realistic, hard look at the human condi-
tion shows that life is still "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and
short."53 Confronted with the harsh truth that "[m]ost of our fel-
low human beings... are underfed and die before their time,"
most observers fall into the tempting "moral trap" of "sit[ting]
back, complacent in one's unique tragedy, and let[ting] the others
go without a meal."54 Even though the stakes in controversies
over librarianship are rarely this stark, tempering the inherent
romanticism of literary culture with a dose of cold scientific real-
ism heightens the value of thorough if quotidian legal analysis. A
proper legal understanding of libraries as repositories and en-
gines of culture thus demands careful attention to doctrinal de-
tails.
The Supreme Court of the United States has decided two
cases implicating librarianship as a constitutionally protected
form of expression. First, the 1982 case of Board of Education v.
Pico55 involved a public school board's decision to remove politi-
cally controversial books such as Slaughterhouse Five, The Naked
50. Eliot, supra note 47, at 223.
51. Id.
52. C. P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES: AND A SEcOND LOOK 22 (1965); cf. id.
at 70 (identifying the rise of "something like a third culture," a community of so-
cial scientists "concerned with how human beings are living or have lived,"
whose sensibilities fall somewhere between the industrialism of the scientific
community and the Luddite romanticism of the humanistic community).
53. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 1996) (1651).
54. SNOW, supra note 52, at 6-7.
55. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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Ape, and A Hero Ain't Nothin' but a Sandwich from high school
and junior high school libraries. Justice Brennan's plurality opin-
ion distinguished between the exercise of a "school Board's discre-
tion to prescribe the curricula of [local] schools" (which reviewing
courts are presumably loath to restrain) and the constitutionally
suspect "removal from school libraries of books originally placed
there by... school authorities, or without objection from them."56
Justice Brennan readily perceived how "the removal of books
from [library] shelves" might "directly and sharply" threaten "the
First Amendment rights of students."57 Indeed, he emphasized
how "the special characteristics of the school library make that
environment especially appropriate for the recognition of the
First Amendment rights of students."5 8 Recognizing "the unique
role of the school library" in providing students the freedom to
exercise a "completely voluntary" and unstructured "opportunity
at self-education and individual enrichment," Justice Brennan
rejected the school board's "claim of absolute discretion" that
would otherwise subjugate "the school library and the regime of
voluntary inquiry that there holds sway."59
Justice Brennan thereupon proposed that the First Amend-
ment's guarantee of freedom of speech should constrain a public
library's "discretion to remove books," but not necessarily its "dis-
cretion.., to choose books to add."60 Although Justice Blackmun
denied "that the right at issue" in Pico was "somehow associated
with the peculiar nature of the school library,"61 he helped Justice
Brennan's plurality respond to Justice Powell's objection in dis-
56. Id. at 862 (plurality opinion) (emphasis omitted). To be sure, the Su-
preme Court has not hesitated to strike down state laws regulating curricular
choices when such laws have offended the Establishment Clause or substantive
due process. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (invalidating as an
unconstitutional establishment of religion a statute requiring the teaching of
creationism alongside evolution); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (in-
validating an outright ban on the teaching of evolution); Bartels v. Iowa, 262
U.S. 404 (1923) (invalidating a ban on the teaching of foreign languages as a
substantive due process violation); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)
(same); see also Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284 (1927) (using a Fifth
Amendment theory of substantive due process to invalidate what was then the
Territory of Hawaii's ban on education in any language besides English or Ha-
waiian); cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (invalidating a law
requiring students to attend public schools to the exclusion of private schools).
57. Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (plurality opinion).
58. Id. at 868 (emphasis omitted).
59. Id. at 869.
60. Id. at 871-72 (emphasis omitted).
61. Id. at 878 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
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sent that courts could scarcely distinguish a "challenge [to] a
school board's decision to remove a book" from "a like challenge to
a... decision not to purchase that identical book."62 Justice
Blackmun identified a "profound practical and evidentiary dis-
tinction between" the "removal of a book and [the] failure to ac-
quire a book": "'There are many reasons why a book is not ac-
quired, the most obvious being limited resources, but there are
few legitimate reasons why a book, once acquired, should be re-
moved from a library not filled to capacity."' 63 In this view, re-
moval decisions are presumptively unconstitutional. In the ab-
sence of "sufficiently compelling reasons," removal of books
already committed to a library's collection suggests that the gov-
ernment is unconstitutionally attempting to "suppress exposure
to ideas-for the sole purpose of suppressing exposure to [the]
ideas" at issue. 64
Twenty-one years after Pico, the Supreme Court gained an-
other opportunity to "examine the role of libraries in our soci-
ety."65 Once again, however, the Court reached no consensus re-
garding the First Amendment limitations on the regulation of
librarianship. The 2003 case of United States v. American Library
Ass'n,66 contested the constitutionality of the Children's Internet
Protection Act (CIPA),67 which conditioned public libraries' re-
ceipt of federal subsidies on the installation of Internet filters de-
signed to block sexually explicit content. Whereas Pico had in-
volved a local school board's decision to remove politically
controversial library books, American Library Ass'n involved local
libraries' objection to conditions on federal financial support. The
government enjoys far greater ability to withhold subsidies from
disfavored speech than to ban it outright.68 Moreover, to the ex-
tent that "differences in the characteristics of new media justify
62. Id. at 895 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also id. at 917-18 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
63. Id. at 878-79 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Pico v. Bd. of Educ., 638 F.2d 404, 436 (2d Cir. 1980)
(Newman, J., concurring in the result), affd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)).
64. Id. at 877 (emphasis omitted).
65. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (plurality
opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
66. Id. at 194.
67. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763A (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§ 9134(f)(1)(A)-(B) (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)-(C) (2000)).
68. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); cf. South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 209 (1987) ("[Ihe constitutional limitations on Congress when ex-
ercising its spending power are less exacting than those on its authority to regu-
late directly.').
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differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them," 69
the transition from conventional books in Pico to the Internet
might have affected the Supreme Court's approach in American
Library Ass'n. Nevertheless, American Library Ass'n resembled
Pico insofar as both cases contested the extent to which the gov-
ernment may remove or restrict library materials.
A splintered Court upheld the CIPA. Speaking for a plurality
of Justices, Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized the need to
grant "public libraries... broad discretion to decide what mate-
rial to provide to their patrons."70 Insofar as libraries forgo "'uni-
versal coverage"' in favor of a more limited quest for "materials
'that would be of the greatest direct benefit or interest to the
community,"' the Chief Justice characterized librarianship as a
selective enterprise of "collect[ing] only those materials deemed to
have 'requisite and appropriate quality."' 71 Libraries and their
staffs, in sum, "necessarily consider content in making collection
decisions and enjoy broad discretion in making them."72
To the Chief Justice, the Internet's presence made no differ-
ence. He echoed the Senate's sentiment that the Internet, as
"'simply another method for making information available in a
school or library,"' was nothing "'more than a technological ex-
tension of the book stack."' 73 Chief Justice Rehnquist accordingly
refused to distinguish public library Internet access from the pro-
vision of "other library resources" in the hope of "facilitat[ing] re-
search, learning, and recreational pursuits" with "materials of
requisite and appropriate quality."74 In his view, a "library's need
to exercise judgment in making collection decisions depends on
69. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969); cf. Denver Area
Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 781 (1996) (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part) (advocating the analysis of laws affecting new communications technolo-
gies "by reference to existing elaborations of constant First Amendment princi-
ples'); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (de-
scribing each medium of speech as "a law unto itself": 'The moving picture
screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck, and the street
corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses, and dangers'). See gener-
ally Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of Speech, 54 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming
April 2005); Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific
Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245 (2003).
70. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 204 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
71. Id. (quoting Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,
421 (E.D. Pa. 2002), rev'd, 539 U.S. 194 (2003)).
72. Id. at 205.
73. Id. at 207 (quoting S. REP. NO. 106-141, at 7 (1999)).
74. Id. at 206.
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its traditional role in identifying suitable and worthwhile mate-
rial... no less.., when it collects material from the Internet
than when it collects material from any other source."
75
The outcome in American Library Ass'n drew two bitter dis-
sents. Justice Stevens condemned the plurality opinion as "'a
dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional
tradition."' 76 For him, discretion in the librarian's craft favored
freedom from CIPA's financial restraints rather than Congress's
power to demand the installation of software filters. Indeed, he
compared libraries' "discretion... regarding what to include in,
and exclude from, their collections" with the constitutionally
privileged "'business of a university... to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."' 77
For his part, Justice Souter focused his dissent on the practi-
cal difference between acquisition and removal decisions. Conced-
ing the "necessary and complex" nature of selectivity "to be selec-
tive with an eye to demand, quality, and the object of
maintaining the library as a place of civilized enquiry," Justice
Souter admitted that "[rleview for rational basis is probably the
most that any court could conduct" in any attack on a library's
"myriad particular selections."78 Complexity and "sheer volume"
thus render acquisition decisions "poor candidates for effective
judicial review."79 In stark contrast from Chief Justice Rehnquist,
however, Justice Souter believed that Internet filtering and
blocking, "[a]t every significant point," "defies comparison to the
process of acquisition."80 'Whereas traditional scarcity of money
and space require [sic] a library to make choices about what to
acquire," Justice Souter observed, "blocking... is not necessi-
tated by scarcity of either money or space."8' "In the instance of
the Internet," he wrote, "what the library acquires is electronic
access, and the choice to block is a choice to limit access that has
already been acquired."82
75. Id. at 208.
76. Id. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc'y, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002)).
77. Id. at 226 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)).
78. Id. at 236 (Souter, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 241-42.
80. Id. at 236.
81. Id. at 236-37.
82. Id. at 237.
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Limiting Internet access demands an affirmative expendi-
ture of library resources. Among library resources, Internet ac-
cess is unusual in that complete acquisition is far cheaper than
partial acquisition. As Justice Kennedy observed the Term before
American Library Ass'n, "it is easy and cheap to reach a world-
wide audience on the Internet... but expensive if not impossible
to reach a geographic subset."8 3 The partitioning required under
the CIPA was content based rather than geographic, but compre-
hensive Internet access remains cheaper than its filtered alterna-
tive. Because leaving Internet access unblocked remains the cost-
free option, "selective blocking by controversial subject matter,"
even more so than the book removal at issue in Pico, "is not a
function of limited resources" and almost surely does not reflect
constitutionally protected "assessment[s] of esthetic or scholarly
merit."84
III. THE EMBODIMENT OF CULTURAL MEMORY AND
PLATFORM FOR FUTURE INNOVATION
What, then, is the constitutional status of the library as an
engine of democratic values? As a fountain of literary, artistic,
and scientific inspiration? As a battleground for First Amend-
ment disputes? The library as embodiment of cultural memory
and platform for future innovation is all these things and more: it
is "touchstone, threat and guiding star."8 5 The fractured Courts
in Pico and American Library Ass'n agreed on at least one point:
"Public libraries pursue the worthy missions of facilitating learn-
ing and cultural enrichment."86 As public officials regulate li-
brarians' efforts to fulfill those "worthy missions," the legal re-
sponse should hinge upon the impact of such regulation on the
simultaneous but contradictory roles of libraries and other cul-
tural resources in a world of speed: to provide a historical frame-
work by which all innovation must be judged and to supply the
ever briefer and more ethereal strands by which such innovation
will be woven. The "important, delicate, and highly discretionary
functions" of library management deserve legal respect and judi-
83. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 595 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment) (citations omitted).
84. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 242 (Souter, J., dissenting).
85. RALPH ELLISON, JUNETEENTH: A NOVEL 16 (John F. Callahan ed.,
2000).
86. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 203 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
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cial deference, but librarians and politicians alike must "perform
within the limits of the Bill of Rights."
87
Modern information technology has placed a premium on ac-
cess to information, but it has simultaneously driven down the
cost of such access. Under prevailing economic and technological
conditions, the line between unreviewable expertise and unlawful
discrimination is the precise distinction between the dismal sci-
ence of acquiring new material and the politics of blocking, re-
moval, and censorship. "Quite simply," wrote Justice Souter in
his American Library Ass'n dissent, "we can smell a rat when a
library blocks material already in its control .... Content-based
blocking and removal tell us something that mere absence from
the shelves does not."88
The Supreme Court's library cases do express a contrary vi-
sion, one arguably more consonant with T. S. Eliot's Tradition
and the Individual Talent than with The Metaphysical Poets.
That vision fell into dissent in Pico but commanded a plurality in
American Library Ass'n. As then-Justice Rehnquist wrote in Pico:
"Education consists of the selective presentation and explanation
of ideas," upon "an orderly exposure to relevant information."
8 9
Elementary and secondary schools as communitarian institutions
operating in loco parentis do indeed prepare pupils "for participa-
tion as citizens" and "inculcat[e] fundamental values necessary to
the maintenance of a democratic political system."90 But even
then-Justice Rehnquist distinguished the inculcating function of
public schools from "the broad-ranging inquiry available to uni-
versity students"91 and presumably also to adults in general.
92
87. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); see also
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (ac-
knowledging "the comprehensive authority of the States and of school offi-
cials ... to prescribe and control conduct in the schools," but stressing that the
exercise of such authority must be "consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards').
88. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 241 (Souter, J., dissenting).
89. Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 914 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
90. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979); accord Pico, 457 U.S. at
864 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). See generally Suzanna Sherry, Responsi-
ble Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131 (1995) (ex-
ploring the "possible constitutional bases" for a right to education).
91. Pico, 457 U.S. at 914 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
92. Cf. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S 525, 564 (2001) (observing
that "the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materi-
als ... does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed
to adults" (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997))); Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 (1983) (refusing to limit the "level of dis-
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Our culture having embraced the ethos and aesthetic of speed,
the "great variety and complexity" of contemporary civilization
demands complete access to the Alexandrian storehouse of arti-
facts and ideas needed to keep pace with the "more and more
comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect" expressions of our
varied and complex lives. Eliot insisted: 'The possible interests of
a poet are unlimited; the more intelligent he is the better; the
more intelligent he is the more likely that he will have interests:
our only condition is that he turn them into poetry, and not
merely meditate on them poetically."93 If we must choose one half
of T. S. Eliot's paradox over the other, The Metaphysical Poets
should prevail over Tradition and the Individual Talent.
America's "hazardous freedom," its commitment to social and
scientific "openness" over the comfort of "absolute regimentation,"
has been "the basis of our national strength and of the independ-
ence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this... of-
ten disputatious society."94 Not for naught has the Supreme
Court described the "right to speak freely and to promote diver-
sity of ideas and programs" as "one of the chief distinctions that
sets us apart from totalitarian regimes."95 Speech, "often provoca-
tive and challenging" and invariably free by law, is intended "to
invite dispute," particularly "when it induces a condition of un-
rest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger."96 Free speech "may strike at prejudices and
preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses
for acceptance of an idea."97
Aggressive protection against political interference in library
management would unite the constitutional law of librarianship
with the First Amendment's "deep commit[ment] to safeguarding
academic freedom" as a "transcendent value."9 8 As "a special con-
course reaching a mailbox... to that which would be suitable for a sandbox");
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (declining to "reduce the adult
population.., to reading only what is fit for children").
93. Eliot, supra note 47, at 220-21.
94. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09(1969); accord Pico, 457 U.S. at 866 (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.).
95. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also id. (ob-
serving the United States' societal desire for a "robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues"' (quoting United States v. Associ-
ated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943))).
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cern of the First Amendment,"99 academic freedom most effec-
tively fosters the "robust exchange of ideas"'100 when governments
and universities respect the individual "right... to seek, teach,
and write the truth."''1 Such "constitutional protection [as] is af-
forded by the First Amendment extends as readily to the scholar
in the laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom."'1 2 The
American research university, which is already the envy of its
counterparts in other countries and which in time may rank
alongside democratic constitutionalism among the United States'
greatest contributions to global civilization, has methodically en-
shrined academic freedom-defined as the "right to speak, to
write, and to teach freely"-as a "precious right.., central to the
very identity of the university in the modern world."'1 3 Our as-
toundingly accelerated society, in which "a minute" provides am-
ple "time / For decisions and revisions which a minute will re-
verse," demands unimpeded access to the full spectrum of ideas
so that makers of culture truly can "dare [to] / Disturb the uni-
verse."104
As between inculcation of the impressionable and experi-
mentation among the experienced, the constitutional jurispru-
dence of librarianship should treat libraries, museums, and other
cultural archives and resources not as ancillary components of
elementary or secondary education, but as extensions of the
greatest research university of them all. 10 5 Empowering re-
searchers, scientists, scholars, and teachers with the "[flreedom
to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation
99. Id.; accord Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226
(1985); see also J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the
First Amendment," 99 YALE L.J. 251 (1989).
100. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; accord United States v. Am. Library Ass'n,
539 U.S. 194, 226 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,
180 (1972).
101. Julius G. Getman & Jacqueline W. Mintz, Foreword: Academic Freedom
in a Changing Society, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1247, 1247 (1988).
102. Dow Chem. Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982).
103. JOHN W. BOYER, ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE MODERN UNIVERSITY:
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 95 (2002), quoted in Am. Li-
brary Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 226 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. T. S. ELIOT, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock, in 2 NORTON
ANTHOLOGY, supra note 39, at 2164.
105. Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991) (acknowledging that "the
university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the func-
tioning of our society that the Government's ability to control speech within that
sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds
is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amend-
ment"); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603-04.
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and experiment" provides "the necessary conditions for the ad-
vancement of scientific knowledge."'106 Freedom to research mat-
ters even more to scholars in the arts, the humanities, and the
social sciences, for the absence of "accepted... absolutes" raises
the risk that politically powerful actors will place vulnerable
speakers in ideological "strait jacket[s]."' 07 Even "[p]rogress in
the natural sciences" demands "unfettered" freedom to engage in
the "hypothesis and speculation" needed to convert "findings
made in the laboratory" into enduring "[i]nsights into the myster-
ies of nature."'108 Creative conjecture is the mother of experimen-
tation and the grandmother of discovery. The physicist Hermann
Weyl's observation in this regard bears remembering: "My work
always tried to unite the true with the beautiful but when I had
to choose one or the other, I usually chose the beautiful."'109 Or, as
John Keats expressed the point, "'Beauty is truth, truth
beauty,'-that is all / Ye know on earth, and all ye need to
know."110
Even those who favor the more dogmatic, "elementary
school" model of the Pico dissenters over the university model of
academic freedom should pause before embracing any constitu-
tional approach that would subject the librarian's craft to political
106. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result) (citation omitted); cf. id. (recognizing four separate
elements of "academic freedom": the ability of the university "to determine for
itself on academic grounds [1] who may teach, [2] what may be taught, [3] how it
shall be taught, and [4] who may be admitted to study') (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 250 (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.); cf. id. at 261-62 (Frank-
furter, J., concurring in the result) ("mhe respective preoccupations of anthro-
pology, economics, law, psychology, sociology and related areas of scholarship
are merely departmentalized dealing, by way of manageable division of analysis,
with interpenetrating aspects of holistic perplexities.').
108. Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). For a sampling
of the extensive literature on scientific research as an activity protected by the
First Amendment, see Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo, and
Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH.
L. REV. 349 (1978); James R. Ferguson, Scientific and Technological Expression:
A Problem in First Amendment Theory, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 519 (1981);
James R. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and the First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L.
REV. 639 (1979); Gary L. Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace The-
ory of the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 417 (1987); Robert M. O'Neil,
Scientific Research and the First Amendment: An Academic Privilege, 16 U.C.
DAvIs L. REV. 837 (1983); John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research:
A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203 (1977).
109. EDWARD 0. WILSON, BIOPHILIA 61 (1984) (quoting Hermann Weyl, "the
perfecter of quantum and relativity theory').
110. JOHN KEATS, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in COMPLETE POEMS 282, 283
(Jack Stillinger ed., 1982).
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control. Invidious decisions to remove books and other items from
the intellectual palette threaten to "strangle the free mind at its
source and teach youth to discount important principles of our
government as mere platitudes."11' Librarianship is a subtle and
complex craft, but no more challenging than "such fields as eco-
nomics, science, technology and psychology," which routinely re-
quire judges to "acquire the learning pertinent to complex techni-
cal questions." 112 "Restraint, yes, abdication, no."113 To surrender
all meaningful review of legislative control over librarianship
risks making a "splendid bauble" of the constitutional promise of
free speech. 114
As in all other questions of constitutional law and democratic
governance, the risk of error haunts this choice. All law is an ex-
periment, as "all life is an experiment."' 1 5 "Every year if not every
day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based
upon imperfect knowledge."'116 As we brace for inevitable errors
in judgment on matters of free speech, we should err in favor of
and not against the right to speak. An unflinching commitment
to "free trade in ideas" rests on the belief that "the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market."117 In this marketplace of ideas, the
"forum where ideas and information flourish," it is "the speaker
and the audience, not the government, [who] assess the value of
the information presented."" 8 'We shall not cease from explora-
tion / And the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we
started / And know the place for the first time."119
111. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943); accord Bd. of
Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 865 (1982) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.); id. at
879 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
112. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); cf. Kassel v. Consol. Freight-
ways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (plurality opinion) (expressing a willing-
ness to invalidate "marginally" effective and "substantially" obtrusive state laws
despite state officials' claimed expertise over regulations designed "to promote
the public health or safety").
113. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 69 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
114. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819) (Mar-
shall, C.J.); accord In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 87 (1890) (Lamar, J., dissenting);
accord The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993); accord Greater New Or-
leans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195 (1999).
119. T. S. ELIOT, Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS, supra note 2, at 49, 59.
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"If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our
minds be bold."120 Favoring access to information over legislative
discretion to conirol library management represents a sound ex-
ercise in democratic self-governance. Allowing the government
too much power to "tell[ ] us what to say or hear for our own
good" places us squarely on the road toward "deforming the en-
tire democratic process,"'121 on the road to serfdom. 122 Resistance
to official control of the means and manifestations of imaginative
expression represents the brightest of "fixed star[s] in our consti-
tutional constellation."'123 Especially in our harried, hurried age of
speed and informational overload, libraries remain "hallowed
place[s]," special public spaces "dedicated to quiet, to knowledge,
and to beauty."124 At the law library at the University of Minne-
sota or any other institution dedicated to fostering cultural mem-
ory and inspiring future innovation in our age of illusion and al-
lusion, we might well glimpse "[slome of the beautiful things that
Heaven bears, /... and once more [see] the stars."'125
120. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
121. Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment,
37 CREIGHTON-L. REV. 579, 651 (2004).
122. See generally F. A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (Milton Friedman
intro., 1994).
123. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
124. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (plurality opinion of For-
tas, J.); accord Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 868 (1982) (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.).
125. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO OF DANTE, canto XXXIV, 11. 139-40, at
373 (Robert Pinsky trans., 2d prtg. 1995) (n.d.).
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